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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium valuation model that incorporates optimal default to show how
mortgage yields and lender recovery rates on defaulted mortgages depend on initial loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios. The analysis treats both the frictionless case and the case in which borrowers and
lenders incur deadweight costs upon default. The model is calibrated using data on California
mortgages. Given reasonable parameter values, the model does a surprisingly good job ﬁtting
the risk premium in the data for high LTV mortgages. Thus, from an ex ante perspective, we do
not ﬁnd strong evidence of systematic underpricing of default risk in the run-up to the housing
market crisis.
We are indebted to seminar participants at UCLA, UCSB, the China Economics and Management Academy, the
Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and San Francisco, the Federal Reserve Board, the University of Adelaide, the
University of Melbourne and Victoria University (Wellington) for comments. The views expressed are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
1Mortgage Default and Mortgage Valuation
It is generally agreed that lenders and investors dramatically underpredicted mortgage default
frequencies in the run-up to the U.S. housing market crisis beginning in 2006. There exist two
possible explanations for this failure. The ﬁrst possibility is that the models of mortgage valuation
and default were misspeciﬁed, either because they were not parameterized accurately or because
they somehow failed to capture the tradeoﬀs faced by actual participants (borrowers and lenders)
in this market. The second possibility is that the models were not ﬂawed, but that the values
taken on by exogenous variables that determine defaults lay in the extreme tails of their assumed
distributions. In this story, practitioners were simply unlucky; even a forecast generated by an
accurate model will be wide of the mark if the shock—in this case, a shock to house prices—is
three or four standard deviations from its mean.
We conclude in favor of the second candidate explanation. Our analysis involves formulating
a model in which changes in housing services, and therefore also house price changes, are taken
to be exogenous and unforecastable by borrowers and lenders. Homeowners ﬁnance their house
purchases with down payments and a mortgage. Borrowers have the option to default on the
mortgage, possibly subject to costs, if house prices drop suﬃciently, and they are assumed to
exercise this option optimally. Here our analysis, like other papers on mortgage default, follows
Merton (1974).
To date, a majority of empirical treatments of mortgage default have focused on reconciling
theoretical models of default with observed default behavior (for example, Deng, Quigley, and
VanOrder (2000)), and do not directly connect optimal default with mortgage loan pricing. A
major contribution of our paper is to make this connection. We do this by assuming that mortgage
lending is subject to free entry and exit, implying a zero-proﬁt condition for lenders. This zero-proﬁt
condition enables us to determine equilibrium yield spreads as a function of initial loan-to-value
ratios and the parameters that characterize house price changes. Because we close the model in
this way, we are able to provide a full theoretical implementation of Merton’s default analysis in
the setting of mortgage markets.
2We ﬁrst conducted this exercise assuming away default costs. Then we assumed that borrowers,
but not lenders, suﬀer costs upon default, and then vice-versa. Finally, we allowed lenders the
opportunity to reﬁnance subject to a prepayment penalty. Mortgage default behavior and pricing
turn out to be very diﬀerent in these cases.
The ﬂexibility implied by the diﬃculty of calibrating these default and prepayment parameters
combined with their strong eﬀect on mortgage pricing variables has implications for how we char-
acterize the link between theory and empirical results. The nuisance-parameter problem rules out
formal tests of the validity of the model. However, we can proceed in a more informal fashion. The
empirical work generates conclusions about what values for mortgage pricing variables are accurate
empirically, so we can calibrate to these values. The question becomes whether parameter values
can be found that reproduce reasonable values for these variables.
The second major ﬁnding of our paper is that we can in fact ﬁnd parameter speciﬁcations that
produce values for mortgage variables similar to what we see in the data. One conclusion that follows
from this ﬁnding is that there is little evidence that mortgages are mispriced relative to underlying
housing prices. This conclusion, of course, depends critically on the maintained assumption that
house price changes are unforecastable. Some observers have taken the view that, contrary to
this, it was obvious that the house price increases that occurred prior to 2006 would shortly be
reversed with high probability, and that lenders should have been aware of this possibility and
should have charged much higher risk premia. On this account high-LTV mortgages were in fact
drastically mispriced. Evidently this line of reasoning contains a considerable element of hindsight.
Our point is that if, contrary to this, one maintains the assumption that housing price changes are
unforecastable, mortgage markets do not show major distortions.
As noted, our answer to the question asked in the ﬁrst paragraph is that the heavy losses market
participants have experienced on mortgages did not primarily reﬂect behavior on the part of market
participants that was drastically diﬀerent from the behavior implied in our model. Rather, the losses
were the inevitable consequence of a three- or four-sigma drop in house prices.1
1Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, and Willen (2009) reach a conclusion similar to ours, albeit using a diﬀerent empirical
approach.
31 Default and Mortgage Valuation
We study the behavior of borrowers and lenders in a stylized housing market where borrowers must
decide how to ﬁnance their housing purchases. To render the analysis tractable, we made three
simplifying assumptions. First, we assumed that mortgages are perpetuities that have no scheduled
payment of principal. Thus, all changes in homeowner equity are due to changes in house prices.
Since almost all the early payments on 30-year mortgages consist of interest rather than principal
repayment, this speciﬁcation does not involve a major distortion. Second, we assumed that the
borrower can always terminate the mortgage by paying the lender its fair market value, even when
that value is less than book value (as will occur when house prices drop). As we will discuss below,
this speciﬁcation eliminates the possibility of optimal defaults triggered by adverse life events that
aﬀect the borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage. Finally, we assumed that interest rates are
deterministic. This simpliﬁcation reﬂects our focus in this paper on credit risk: speciﬁcally, on
the diﬀerence in mortgage rates induced by existence of the default option for loans with diﬀerent
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs).
We also considered the eﬀect of giving the borrower the option to prepay the loan at its book
value subject to a prepayment penalty. Existence of this option aﬀects mortgage pricing even though
we abstracted away from the interest rate ﬂuctuations that are usually taken as the major reason
for prepayment. In our model prepayment occurs because increases in house values decrease the
value of the default option, implying that borrowers whose homes have appreciated are overpaying
for the default option. Borrowers are motivated to reduce their payment for the default option to
its economic value by reﬁnancing. Like Downing, Stanton, and Wallace (2005), we found that the
existence of the default option aﬀects the value of the prepayment option, and vice versa.
We took house prices to be exogenous, thereby shutting down any link between mortgage
underwriting practices and house prices. This is a shortcoming, as it is possible that increasingly
lax underwriting standards were a contributor to the price run-up that occurred in the decade prior
to 2006 (see Coleman, LaCour-Little, and Vandell (2008) and Mian and Suﬁ (2009)).
41.1 The Model Setting
Our model, like all existing structural mortgage valuation models that incorporate default, is based
on Merton’s classic paper (Merton (1974)), adapted to the housing market. We assume that housing
services x follow a geometric Brownian motion:
dx = xdt + xdz; (1.1)
where  is the average proportional increase over time in the level of housing services,  is the
associated volatility, and z is a standard Brownian motion. As applied to investment property,
x can be interpreted as the diﬀerence between rental income and costs to the owner of utilities,
repairs, and so on.
It is assumed that the price of housing equals the expectation of future housing services dis-








Here Et is the conditional expectations operator. This speciﬁcation implies that house prices are
a geometric Brownian motion and, hence, house price changes are unforecastable.2 As a scale
choice, we will set x(0), the value of housing services at the date the mortgage is initiated, equal
to 1 henceforth. Thus mortgages are initiated when the price of housing equals 1=(   ): The
valuation model (1.2) can be justiﬁed either by interpreting the probability measure in eq. (1.1)
as the risk-neutral measure or more simply by directly assuming that agents are risk neutral. The
latter assumption is acceptable here because we are not interested in the eﬀects of risk aversion on
mortgage valuation. As noted, mortgages are assumed to be perpetuities (conditional on nonoc-
currence of default), and to be indexed by the level of the periodic payment c; which we take as
exogenous.
The cash supplied by the lender toward the purchase equals the expected present value of the
2This assumption for the house price process rules out bubbles, and is standard in the mortgage pricing and
default literature. See Deng, Quigley, and VanOrder (2000), Downing, Stanton, and Wallace (2005), and Kau and
Keenan (1995).
5mortgage payments, making appropriate allowance for default as described below. Thus low (high)
LTV mortgages can be generated by setting c at a low (high) level. The borrower is assumed to
supply the remainder of the purchase price as a down payment.
We will see that, depending on the evolution of x; the fair values of mortgages may fall short
of their book values or exceed them. In the latter case borrowers are motivated to pay oﬀ the
mortgages. For the present it is assumed that they cannot do so.
1.2 Costless Default
As noted, it is assumed in this subsection that default is costless to both the borrower and the
lender. Thus the borrower is assumed to be able to terminate the mortgage at any time by turning
over the house to the lender. He incurs no costs due, for example, to reduced access to credit or
moving costs. Correspondingly, the lender suﬀers no loss of value when taking over a foreclosed
property.
Borrowers choose the default rule that maximizes the value of their home equity, E(x), or,
equivalently, minimizes the value of their mortgage liability, M(x). Using dynamic programming
it can be shown that maximizing the value of equity implies that E(x) satisﬁes the stochastic
diﬀerential equation
E(x)dt = Ex[dE(x)] + (x   c)dt; (1.3)
where dt is the increment in time and Ex denotes conditional expectation. Thus the discounted
gain on E(x) is a martingale, as implied by absence of arbitrage. Here x   c is the analogue of
dividends in a stock valuation expression, except that x c can be either positive or negative, and
dE(x) is the capital gain. Using Ito’s lemma, (1.3) leads to the (deterministic) diﬀerential equation
1
2
x22E00(x) + xE0(x)   E(x) =  x + c: (1.4)
This diﬀerential equation is similar to those arising in ﬁnance and also in the real options literature
(see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Ch. 7 for detailed and very clear exposition of a model that contains
6the model here as a special case). The boundary conditions are the value-matching condition
E(x) = 0 (1.5)
and the smooth pasting condition
E0(x) = 0: (1.6)
The smooth pasting condition is a necessary condition for optimal exercise of the default option
since default is a free boundary. It requires that M(x) be tangent to x=(   ) at x.
The value of the mortgage equals the value of the house less the borrower’s equity. Thus the
value-matching condition implies that the value of the mortgage at x equals the value of the house,
x=(   ); and the smooth pasting condition implies that the slope of the mortgage value as a
function of x is 1=(   ) at x = x: These boundary conditions allow solution for the constant of
integration e.
For x > x; the solution to the diﬀerential equation is



























(the constant of integration associated with the positive root equals zero).3
The value of the mortgage is given by
3For x < x; E(x) does not follow the solution (1.7) to the diﬀerential equation (1.4). The simplest way to see
this is to observe that for x < x immediate default is optimal. That being so, the value of the mortgage equals the
value of the house, implying that E(x) = P(x)   M(x) = 0:









and eq. (1.7). Because m is negative, when x is high the mortgage value approaches c= asymp-
totically, agreeing with the value it would have in the absence of default. This makes sense: when
x is extremely high, default in the foreseeable future is improbable, so it does not materially aﬀect
valuation of the mortgage. However, for values of x that are not high, M(x) depends positively on
x:
Having calculated M(x), one can compute the initial LTV ratio M(1)=P(1); the initial mortgage
yield c=M(1), and the recovery rate P(x)=M(1):4
1.3 A Numerical Example
We now provide a numerical example of the equity values and mortgage values as a function of
house services that are implied by this model. Our parametrization assumes that  = 7%,  = 3%;
 = 10%, so that the average (real) proportional gain on both the equity and the mortgage is 7%,
and the initial price-rent ratio is 1=(   ) = 25 (real-world price-rent ratios are closer to 10 or
15 than 25, but recall that here we are abstracting away from operating costs such as repairs and
utilities expense). The standard deviation of the change in housing services, , is taken to be 10%.
Under these parameter values a security similar to a prime mortgage can be generated by
specifying that the mortgage payment c is 1.25. We term this mortgage the “low-LTV” mortgage.
This is the speciﬁcation used to compute E(x) shown in Figure 1. Even though the initial LTV
is 71.1%, default does not occur until the house value drops to 62.5% of its original value. At
that price the recovery rate (ratio of collateral value at the default point to the origination value
of the mortgage) is 87.9%. The yield on the mortgage at its origination date, equal to c=M(1); is
4In the calibration section we will make use of the fact that the recovery rate equals the quotient of the default
point and LTV.






7.03%. The diﬀerence between this rate and the expected return on the mortgage, 7%, represents
compensation for the possibility that the collateral value will drop, leading to default.
A high-LTV mortgage results if c is increased from 1.25 to 1.75. This increase in the periodic
payment results in an increase in the initiation value of the mortgage; the initial LTV ratio is 95.1%.
Default occurs if the house value drops to 87.5% of its original value. Thus, as would be expected,
the magnitude of the price drop that is just suﬃcient to induce default is much smaller under the
high-LTV mortgage than under the low-LTV mortgage. Under the low-LTV mortgage the down
payment protects the lender from all but the most drastic price drops, whereas under a high-LTV
mortgage the lender has much less protection. Correspondingly, the recovery rate, 92.0%, is higher
under the high-LTV mortgage than under the low-LTV mortgage.
The fact that default is likelier under the high-LTV mortgage than under the low-LTV mortgage
implies that a higher yield, 7.4%, is needed to compensate the lender for the higher default risk.
It is seen that the higher default probability under the high-LTV mortgage relative to the low-
LTV mortgage more than outweighs the fact that the recovery rate is higher under the high-LTV
mortgage than under the low-LTV mortgage.
The example demonstrates an underappreciated feature of option-based default models: optimal
default does not occur until the borrower is substantially “underwater” on the mortgage. The reason
9lies in the distinction between the economic value and the book value of the mortgage. A default
calculation based on book value would suggest that borrowers should default when house price falls
by the amount of the borrower’s equity at the origination date (falls to 71.1% in this example).
This decision rule is also depicted in Figure 1, labeled \E(x), incorrect.” To see that this decision
rule is not optimal, assume that this locus in fact describes E(x), and that the house price drops to
exactly 71.1% so that E(71:1%) = 0. If prices were to fall below 71.1%, the borrower could default
instantly and avoid any further loss. In contrast, if house prices were to rise, then the borrower
would instantly have strictly positive home equity. Thus the borrower would strictly prefer not to
default, contrary to the implication of the diagram that he is indiﬀerent as to whether or not to
default. It follows that E(71:1%) > 0, contrary to the diagram.
For a default point to be optimal, the borrower must be indiﬀerent between defaulting and
staying in the mortgage at the default point. In our setup, this condition is met by imposing the
smooth pasting condition on the solution along with the value-matching condition, which guarantees
that the asset value (the house value) and the mortgage value are not just equal at the default point,
but also tangent to each other.
To gain further insight into the characteristics of the model solution, we show how mortgage
pricing varies with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of house price volatility. We computed E(x) against x for
various values of volatility that bracket 10%. The computed curves are shown in Figure 2. Standard
options analysis applies here: the higher the volatility of house price changes, the greater is the
value of the default option for given x, as reﬂected in E(x): Also, higher volatilities are associated
with lower default points.
To get a diﬀerent view of the eﬀect of alternative speciﬁcations of price volatility on mortgage
default and mortgage pricing, we also computed the tradeoﬀ between mortgage yield and LTV for
diﬀerent values of volatility. These tradeoﬀs were obtained by varying the periodic payment c; and
are shown in Figure 3.
10Figure 2: Market Value of Homeowner Equity as Function of Housing
Services, House Price Volatility
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Figure 3: Mortgage Yield as Function of LTV




























The model as speciﬁed so far implies that default is always voluntary: agents will default when
x < x; and they can and will avoid default when x > x: This conclusion reﬂects the assumption
that when housing services equal x lenders will be willing to accept the market value of the mortgage,
M(x); as payment for extinguishing the mortgage. Lenders are willing to do so even though when
x < 1, M(x) is less than the book value of the mortgage because of the increased risk of default when
x < 1 relative to when x = 1: Short sales, under which the lender voluntarily accepts repayment
of the mortgage at less than its book value, reﬂect the fact that M(x) is less than the book value
of the mortgage when x < 1: Thus in the model as speciﬁed life events such as job loss or medical
expenses do not aﬀect optimal default.
Contrary to our model speciﬁcation, in reality lenders will usually accept mortgage repayment
only at full book value (or more, if there exist prepayment penalties) even when full book value
exceeds market value. This is so because, ﬁrst, the borrower cannot credibly threaten to default
with high probability if the short sale request is denied. Second, most mortgages are securitized,
in which case the servicer often does not have authority to restructure mortgages to avoid default.
In any case he almost always lacks incentive to do so. In such cases if the book value of equity
is negative the borrower who cannot continue to pay the mortgage may be unable to reﬁnance or
sell proﬁtably even when the market value of the equity is positive. In such settings the assertion
above that life events like unemployment do not aﬀect mortgage defaults no longer applies.
1.5 Second-Lien Mortgages
In practice, borrowers who need a high LTV mortgage often obtain two mortgages: a ﬁrst-lien
mortgage, usually at 80%, and a second-lien mortgage for the diﬀerence, which is typically on the
order of 10% or 15%. The ﬁrst-lien mortgage is senior to the second-lien mortgage, meaning that
in the event of default the recovery is applied to it ﬁrst. There are two institutional reasons for
dividing up the mortgage in this way. First, until recently the government agencies declined to
insure high-LTV mortgages, rendering them diﬃcult to securitize. Accordingly, dividing mortgages
into two pieces made it possible to securitize the senior mortgage. Second, many lenders insisted
12on mortgage insurance when the LTV exceeded 80%, so dividing the mortgage into two securities
allowed borrowers to avoid the insurance expense on the senior security.
The model set forth in this paper can easily accommodate dividing a mortgage into two or
more pieces. It is reasonable to assume that the borrower’s default point is that implied by the
LTV associated with the sum of the values of the two mortgages. The question now is how the
decomposition of the recovery into payments to the senior and junior debt-holders aﬀects their
pricing. Surprisingly, in plausible cases under the model set out here the existence of a second lien
actually reduces default risk for the ﬁrst lien-holder. In such cases the existence of a second lien
would be expected to reduce the equilibrium yield on the ﬁrst lien.
To see this, recall the “low-LTV” (71.l%) and “high-LTV” (95.1%) mortgages discussed above.
Assume that the high-LTV mortgage is decomposed into the low-LTV mortgage and a second lien
with an initial value of 24.0% of the purchase price. The default point of the high-LTV mortgage
is x = 87:5; implying that the division of that mortgage into two securities results in the senior
mortgage having a 100% recovery rate in the event of default. In contrast, in the absence of the
second lien, default would occur at x = 62:5%; implying a partial loss for the ﬁrst lienholder.
Thus existence of the second lien ensures that default is timely (from the point of view of the ﬁrst
lien-holder). As a result the ﬁrst lien would be priced as if it were free of default risk in the presence
of the second lien, but not otherwise.
2 Costly Default and Prepayment
2.1 Costly Borrower Default
In the model of the preceding section the default option is a device that allows sharing between
the owner and the lender of the risk of house price decreases. Without a mortgage the owner
obviously bears 100% of the risk, whereas when a lender supplies part of the purchase price, the
fact that the value of the mortgage drops as house value drops implies that the lender provides
partial insurance to the borrower against the risk of loss of value. The proportions in which the
loss is shared between the borrower and lender depend on the volatility of house price changes and
13the terms of the mortgage. The associated transfer of risk entails no deadweight loss, due to the
assumption of zero default costs. Accordingly, high-LTV loans imply no ineﬃciency.
To the extent that the preceding analysis, including the assumption of zero default costs, applies
to the US crisis of the last several years, the interpretation is that mortgage markets exhibited
nothing that can be called an institutional failure. Along these lines, the story incorporated in
the model just presented is that house values dropped several trillion dollars, but these costs were
unaﬀected by the extent of mortgage default. On this interpretation the use of subprime mortgages
did not contribute to the magnitude of the loss, and the losses associated with default were a pure
transfer involving no deadweight loss.
There is now general agreement in the literature that it is not possible to explain the empirical
patterns of mortgage defaults while maintaining the assumption of costless default (e.g., Deng,
Quigley, and VanOrder (2000)). Indeed, it appears that some subprime loans were granted that
had negative equity at the date of origination, and this is so under either the book or market
deﬁnition of equity. Existence of such mortgages is possible only in the presence of costs of default
that induce borrowers to continue making payments on the loan even when their equity is negative.
In the absence of such costs borrowers would default immediately upon closing a negative-equity
mortgage. Lenders, anticipating this, would never grant negative-equity mortgages. Thus, the
existence of newly originated mortgage loans with negative economic equity is evidence in favor of
positive default costs.
Default costs to the borrower include the expense of moving necessitated by eviction, and
also the costs associated with impaired access to credit markets in the future. Costs to the lender
include expenses incurred repairing, maintaining and reselling foreclosed properties, and also include
foregone income during the period (which may be a year or more) between when the borrower
terminates mortgage payments and when the lender can gain possession of the property. 5
To determine the eﬀects of default costs on pricing and expected default behavior we assume
the existence of constants kb and kl that capture the default costs of the borrower and lender,
5The press has reported many instances when defaulting borrowers stole appliances and vandalized the properties
upon vacating foreclosed houses. To forestall such behavior, some lenders have oﬀered payments of several thousand
dollars to owners of foreclosed properties who turned them over to lenders in satisfactory condition.
14respectively. It is assumed that these costs are not received as revenue by any party (of course, one
can model costs paid by the lender and received by the borrower, or vice-versa, by setting kl equal
to  kb). We also assume that default costs are proportional to the initial value of the house at the
origination date. We did this so as to be able to carry over the assumption of scale-invariance, which
implies that the convention that x = 1 at the mortgage origination date is a harmless numeraire
choice. Default costs are assumed to be the same for all borrowers, implying unrealistically that all
mortgages with the same contract terms will default, and at the same time, if any of them does.
Similarly, all lenders have the same costs.
As in the absence of default costs, it is assumed that there is free entry into, and exit from,
the lending industry. Accordingly, lenders adjust loan terms so as to pass the discounted expected
value of default costs on to borrowers.
Existence of costly default implies that it is necessary to distinguish between the value of a
mortgage to the borrower as a liability and its value to the lender as an asset. The easiest way
to see this is to observe that when x = x the mortgage has liability value of x=(   ) + kb to
the borrower and asset value of x=(   )   kl to the lender. Thus the deadweight loss resulting
from default at the time of default equals kb + kl. We denote the values of the mortgage to the
borrower and the lender as Mb(x) and Ml(x): For any x we have Mb(x) > Ml(x); this diﬀerence is a
decreasing function of x because for high values of x the possibility of default is minor contributor
to the value of the loan to either borrower or lender. Both mortgage values converge to c= as x
goes to inﬁnity, which equals the value of the mortgage when there is no default.6
In this subsection it is assumed that kl = 0; so that borrowers, but not lenders, may have
nonzero default costs.
Incorporating borrowers’ default costs into the model presented above is achieved by replacing
6The presence of deadweight losses due to costly default implies an inconsistency in the formulation of the model.
The model speciﬁes that the discounted value at t of expected housing services equals xt=( ) regardless of whether
or not a mortgage is used. This speciﬁcation makes no allowance for the present value of the loss due to default risk
when a mortgage is used. Thus when either kb or kl is greater than zero, house buyers using mortgages would ﬁnd
that houses are overpriced relative to the expected value of subsequent housing services.
One could eliminate the problem just noted by setting the initial price at a level lower than 1=(   ): However,
the indicated amount of the decrease depends on the loan-to-value ratio. This is diﬀerent for diﬀerent values of c; the
determination of which we are not modeling, so it is unclear how great a decrease to specify. Thus this respeciﬁcation
does not provide an easy resolution of the problem. We prefer to avoid the major respeciﬁcations that would be
required to deal with this diﬃculty.
15the value-matching condition (1.5) with
Eb(x) =  kb; (2.1)
so that borrowers default when their equity equals  kb. Here Eb(x) (i.e., P(x)   Mb(x)) is the
borrower’s equity. The smooth pasting condition is E0
b(x) = 0. The values of the mortgage to the
borrower and the lender as a function of x are then calculated by using the boundary conditions
as modiﬁed to derive the constants of integration of the diﬀerential equations representing Mb(x)
and Ml(x):
For each speciﬁcation of default costs we computed the loci of pairs of LTV ratios and mortgage
yields in the presence of default costs (see Figure 4). Whenever default costs are strictly positive
there are two loci, one corresponding to the initial value of the loan to the borrower and one
corresponding to the initial value of the loan to the lender. In Figure 4 it is assumed that kb = 8;
so that kb equals 32% of the assumed purchase price of 25. For comparison we also show the
corresponding locus when default costs are zero. As above, we assumed  = 10%:
Figure 4 illustrates the consequences of the fact that default is less probable when it is costly
to the borrower than when it is costless: for any LTV ratio the equilibrium mortgage yield is lower
in the presence of default costs than in their absence. As would be expected, this eﬀect is more
pronounced for high-LTV mortgages.
In the presence of borrower’s costs as just speciﬁed the maximum coupon is c = 2:82, so that
the mortgage payment is almost three times the initial service yield of the house. Accordingly, the
value of the mortgage as a liability to the borrower equals 132% of the value of the house. At that
value of c the lender would supply 100% of the value of the house. The borrower would default
virtually immediately (with probability 1), incurring default costs equal by assumption to 32% of
the value of the house.
Now consider lower values of c: In that case the borrower would not default immediately. Since
the lender would receive high payments for some strictly positive interval of time, he would be
willing to supply more cash than when c = 2:82. This explains the backward-bending LTV-yield
locus based on the lender’s mortgage value (indicated in Figure 4).
16Figure 4: Mortgage Yield as Function of LTV, Borrower Default Costs
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17We would not expect to see values of c between 2.38 and 2.82 in equilibrium. For these high
values of c lenders would be willing to supply more cash if at the same time they decreased the
coupon, so as to decrease the probability of default. Borrowers would insist that they do so. The
maximum mortgage payment that is not dominated in this way is that which maximizes the lender’s
LTV. As the diagram indicates, this is c = 2:38. At this coupon the lender supplies 110% of the
value of the house, and the liability value of the mortgage to the borrower is 126%. This value of
c produces a yield of 8.75%. For successively lower coupons the lender is willing to supply lower
amounts of cash, and mortgages are priced to generate yields less than 8.75%.
2.2 Costly Lender Default
In this section we set the borrower’s default cost kb equal to zero and set the lender’s default cost
kl equal to 8. Assuming ﬁxed c, nonzero kl does not aﬀect the default point relative to the case
in which kl = 0; the borrower has no incentive to take any account of the seller’s default costs.
Figure 5 shows that for any yield the lender will supply less cash in the presence of default costs
compared to the zero default cost case, for the obvious reason that the mortgage is costlier to him
in the event of default. Thus for ﬁxed c, high kl implies low initial LTV.
With lenders’ default costs the maximal mortgage payment is 2.26, at which point default is
immediate with probability 1. The existence of a 32% default cost implies that the lender would
supply 68% of the purchase price.
As with borrowers’ costs, the lenders’ LTV-yield locus is backward-bending, and the upper
portion is dominated. The maximal value of c that is not dominated is c = 1:83; at which value
the lender will supply 78% of the value of the house. At this value of c the yield on the mortgage
is 9.40% and the value of the mortgage as a liability to the borrower is 93%.
2.3 Costly Prepayment
Up to now it has been assumed that mortgages are terminated only by default, so that, conditional
on no default, mortgages are perpetuities. This is obviously a simpliﬁcation: borrowers have the
option to prepay mortgages at their book values, possibly subject to a prepayment penalty. In the
18Figure 5: Mortgage Yield as Function of LTV, Lender Default Costs
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19real world they elect to prepay and reﬁnance when prevailing interest rates drop, since otherwise
the present value of the mortgage payments would exceed the mortgage’s book value. Under the
present model this feature is absent since we are taking interest rates to be deterministic and
constant.
As noted in the introduction, in the present model increases in house prices generate a motive
for prepayment even when interest rates are deterministic. This is so because mortgage values
increase with x due to the decreased probability of default in the economically relevant future.
For x > 1 borrowers are paying a higher price for default risk than is justiﬁed actuarially, since
mortgage payments are based on the default probability appropriate at the origination date, when
x = 1: This, of course, is the reason we have M(x) > M(1) for x > 1: Thus borrowers have an
incentive to prepay their mortgages when the value of the collateral rises above 1=(   ).
The model predicts that borrowers will be willing to make high periodic payments on high-LTV
prepayable mortgages because they expect to be able to reﬁnance on better terms after generating
additional equity due to capital gains. Further, they are protected from large losses due to decreases
in property values because of the default option and the low level of their equity. Thus lenders are
subjected to default losses if house values drop, but, due to prepayment, are unable to beneﬁt from
large gains if they occur. We therefore expect that lenders will require high periodic payments for
high LTV mortgages that are prepayable, particularly if (1) borrowers’ default costs are low, so
that they will default at high values of x, (2) lenders’ default costs are high, and (3) prepayment
penalties are low. For the same reasons, borrowers will accept such terms. As emphasized in the
ﬁnancial press, in the past several years we have seen exactly the pattern just described.
In the absence of prepayment costs, borrowers would be motivated to prepay continuously
whenever x > 1. To avoid this unrealistic prediction, we assume that prepayment is subject to
a penalty kp; so that borrowers will prepay only when the values of their mortgages exceed their
origination values M(1) by at least kp:7 It is assumed that prepayment is subject to penalty kp
7Note that by deleting the subscipt on M(x) we are excluding default costs. There is a conceptual problem in
modeling prepayment in the presence of default costs. If the prepayment penalty is less than the deadweight loss due
to default costs at x = 1; then default will occur at x = 1: To see this, suppose that kp < Mb(1)   Ml(1): Then by
immediately prepaying their mortgages, borrowers can replace the liability Mb(1) with the cost kp +Ml(1), which by
assumption is lower. The bizarre implication that borrowers would prepay a mortgage that they had just incurred
reﬂects the exogenous speciﬁcation that homeowners borrow despite the deadweight costs of doing so (when kb or kl
20regardless of when the prepayment occurs. In reality prepayment penalties apply only during the
ﬁrst several years of the mortgage. Our speciﬁcation has the advantage that it makes possible
extension of the stationary setting adopted in earlier sections.
Deﬁne x as the level of x at which borrowers elect to prepay. To derive an upper bound for kp;
note that if kp > c= M(1); the amount the borrower would have to prepay exceeds the maximum
value of the mortgage. In that case the borrower will never prepay (x = 1). Thus in the absence
of prepayment costs we have 1 < x < 1 only when 0 < kp < c=   M(1): We assume that these
inequalities are satisﬁed.
As shown above, the diﬀerential equation deﬁning E(x) has the solution







Here, as opposed to the derivation of E(x) when no prepayment was allowed, both constants of








The boundary conditions are the value-matching conditions





+ E(1)   kp: (2.5)
The smooth pasting conditions are




exceeds zero), but are free to terminate the loan at any time upon payment of the penalty kp (see the discussion in
footnote 6. To ensure that reﬁnancing occurs only when x is strictly higher than 1 it is suﬃcient to restrict attention
to values of kp that exceed Mb(1)   Ml(1):
We sidestep this problem by allowing borrowers to have a prepayment option only when there are no default costs.
21Deﬁne x as the default point when there is a prepayment option. Then lower values of kp
induce lower values of both x, and x. To see this, suppose initially that kl is very high, so
that that there is no prepayment. In that case the borrower is indiﬀerent between defaulting and
continuing to pay the mortgage when x = x. Now decrease kp to allow prepayment. Existence of
the prepayment option increases the equity of the homeowner for each x, implying that E(x) > 0.
It follows that x < x.
Figure 6 shows mortgage yield as a function of LTV under  = 15% and c = 1:5, assuming
several prepayment regimes. The solid line shows mortgage values in the absence of a prepayment
option. This speciﬁcation yields the lowest mortgage yield for each value of LTV, as would be
expected because then the lender beneﬁts from the decreasing default risk as x increases. The
other extreme, generated by kp = 0:1 and indicated by the dotted line, produces a high yield for
each LTV. This is so because the borrower will reﬁnance after experiencing a minor capital gain,
so the lender has only a small upside. The cases kp = 0:5 and kp = 0:25 are intermediate.
As Downing, Stanton, and Wallace (2005) observed, the prepayment option interacts with
the default option. Most obviously, in the present model borrowers would have no motive to
prepay in the absence of the default option. Conversely, the optimal default point depends on
the prepayment regime: the cheaper prepayment is, the lower the optimal default point. Figure 7
shows the dependence of the optimal default point on the prepayment penalty.
22Figure 6: Mortgage Yield as Function of LTV, Prepayment























23Figure 7: Mortgage Value with and without Prepayment Penalty




















243 Implementation of the Model
3.1 Data
We used data provided by LPS Applied Analytics. LPS collects loan-level data on mortgage
characteristics and performance from nine of the top ten US mortgage servicers, accounting for
about 60 percent of the entire U.S. mortgage market. The overall historical data set contains about
107 million loans, with about 33 million active loans as of the end of 2008.
In order to reduce the data set to a more manageable size we restricted attention to loans
made on properties in California. Our sample contains loans originated between 2000 and 2007.
We limited our attention to conventional loans originated for home purchases. We adopted this
restriction because reﬁnancing decisions are governed largely (but not entirely, as discussed above)
by interest rate changes, which are suppressed in the model presented here.8
Table 1: Summary statistics
Full sample 2002 2006
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev
Origination amount ($000) 392 265 290 199 461 291
Term of Loan (months) 360 41 348 45 375 47
Loan-to-value .75 .14 .76 .16 .76 .15
Subprime .05 .03 .08
Jumbo .42 .29 .43
Fixed-rate .45 .67 .33
Adjustable-rate .54 .32 .66
Securitized .82 .84 .84
Non-agency securitization .44 .27 .57
FICO at origination 724 54 725 55 720 55
Fixed-rate spread over 10yr Treasury 1.78% .52% 2.02% .43% 1.63% .48%
ARM margin over benchmark 2.84% 1.24% 2.54% .61% 3.19% 1.53%
Observations 993,943
Even with these restrictions, the sample consists of nearly 1 million mortgages. Summary data
for the sample are shown in Table 1. The mean loan amount was $360,000 and the mean loan
8Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2008) called attention to the tendency for borrowers to extract equity and thereby
alter their leverage through a cash-out reﬁnance. We abstract from this phenomenon, as borrowers in our model face
no credit constraints.
25term is 30 years. About 5 percent of the loans were labeled by the originator as being subprime.9
About 42 percent of the loans are nonconforming jumbo loans, a much higher ﬁgure than would
obtain nationally. This statistic represents the fact that California housing prices are higher than
those in other parts of the country, implying that a larger proportion of California loans exceed
the upper bound for conforming loan amounts than is true nationwide. A full 84 percent of the
loans were securitized. More than half of the securitized loans were nonagency, or private-label,
securitizations.
Many of the variables in Table 1 are interpreted naturally as default risk factors. As such, they
do not enter directly into the formal model developed above: in the model borrowers are treated
as homogeneous and are assumed to be able to reﬁnance whenever the market value of equity
is positive. As noted, these assumptions are unrealistic empirically. As a result of borrowers’
inability to prepay mortgages at market values when these values have dropped due to housing
price decreases, one would expect default rates to reﬂect borrowers’ risk factors as well as house
price changes. Accordingly, risk factors such as the credit score and other variables speaking to
ability to repay mortgages would be expected to inﬂuence default behavior and mortgage rates.
The credit score (i.e., the FICO score) is the main demographic control used in the empirical
analysis. The mean FICO score in the sample is 724, which would generally indicate a prime
borrower. Despite the fact that the theory presented above deals only with ﬁxed-rate mort-
gages (FRMs), we will frequently make comparisons between FRMs and adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs). We do this because it turns out that these two classes of mortgages have diﬀerent default
behavior as well as pricing characteristics.
The fact that our formal model does not incorporate borrower risk variables would not be a
major concern if these risk variables were uncorrelated with LTV ratios. However, this uncorrelat-
edness property is not satisﬁed in the data. Table 2 shows a correlation matrix between LTV ratios
and several risk variables. As expected, high LTV ratios are associated with risky borrowers; that
is, borrowers with low FICO scores. Borrowers with high LTVs are more likely to have an ARM
9Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2008) reported that subprime loan originations increased from about 10% of total
mortgage originations nationwide in the early 2000s to a peak of 35% of total originations. Thus, subprime loans
appear to be underrepresented in the LPS data.
26than a FRM. To deal with these associations we will include controls for borrower risk in many of
the tabulations.
Table 2: Correlation matrix for risk factors
LTV FICO ARM Jumbo
LTV 1
FICO -.24 1
ARM .12 -.12 1
Jumbo .05 .09 .34 1
Table 1 also displays summary statistics for mortgages originated in two years, 2002 and 2006.
Since 2002 followed a recession and 2006 coincided with the peak of the housing boom, comparison
of these two years provides a useful summary of mortgage market changes over time. First, note
that the run-up of housing prices in the ﬁrst half of the current decade coincided with a sharp
increase in average loan size: from $290,000 in 2002 to $461,000 in 2006. One would expect that
average LTVs would drop over the period since individuals changing homes in 2006 could carry over
major capital gains, which was much less true in 2002. However, there was no change in average
LTV ratios, pointing to the fact that individuals were apparently using debt to ﬁnance higher levels
of consumption than would otherwise be possible. It is important to remember that the LTV ratios
used here are computed from the ﬁrst lien mortgage. As we discuss below, true leverage was surely
higher in aggregate than what is reported in Table 1.
The proportion of the sample labeled subprime almost tripled, from 3% to 8%, between 2002
and 2006. The proportion of loans that exceeded conforming loan limits set by the GSEs (the jumbo
share) increased from 29 per cent to 43 per cent. Signiﬁcantly, in 2002 about two-thirds of the loans
were FRMs, with the remainder being ARMs, while these ratios were reversed in 2006.10 Again,
the increase in loan amounts necessitated by rising housing prices led rising numbers of borrowers
to use ARMs, for which qualifying is easier. Finally, securitization rates were much higher in 2006
than in 2002.
Figure 8 shows that average FICO scores were somewhat lower in 2006 than in 2002. That
10FRMs and ARMs make up about 99% of the loans in the sample in any given year. Interest-only and option-
ARMs are classiﬁed as adjustable-rate mortgages for these purposes. The remaining 1% of the sample consists of
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FICO scores dropped at all over this period is surprising: housing prices had risen sharply from
2002 to 2006, implying that most homeowners in ﬁnancial diﬃculty could readily reﬁnance or sell
in order to avoid defaulting on ﬁnancial obligations. The fact that FICO scores dropped despite
this fact is consistent with other evidence of declining underwriting standards during this period
(see Demyanyk and van Hemert (2008)).
3.2 LTV and Default
The theoretical model presented above focused on initial LTV and changes in house prices as the
major determinants of default. It is not diﬃcult to link house price changes to default behavior
in the data.11 House prices in California doubled between 2000 and the peak in 2006, and then
proceeded to fall by more than 25% through year-end 2008. In the early part of this period
delinquency rates were very low and stable, before starting a dramatic upward surge at about
the same time as the peak in house prices. Generally speaking, California housing markets that
experienced large price declines were also characterized by high default rates (see Figure 9).
11See Doms, Furlong, and Krainer (2008), Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2008), and the references therein for a
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Theory suggests that default rates for borrowers with high LTVs will be more sensitive to house
price declines than those for low LTV borrowers. Unfortunately, directly testing this implication
of the model is not straightforward. The problem is that, as noted above, high-LTV borrowers
frequently combine an 80% ﬁrst-lien mortgage with a second lien rather than borrow the full amount
using a single mortgage. We have no information about which ﬁrst-lien mortgages are linked to a
second-lien mortgages, but have every suspicion that such linkages exist. To see this, consult Figure
10, which shows the distribution of LTV ratios in 2002 and 2006 for FRMs and ARMs. In 2002
a considerable fraction (22%) of the ﬁrst-lien FRMs had LTVs greater than 80%. This fraction
diminished to about 6% in 2006. As Figure 10 suggests, the reshaping of this distribution resulted
in a strong concentration of loans with exactly 80% LTV. Given the sharply rising house prices over
this time period that generally outpaced increases in income, the presumption is that a substantial
fraction of the 80% mortgages were associated with second-lien mortgages, raising the combined
LTV above the level indicated by the data by an amount that we cannot directly measure.
In our data, the default rate on 80% LTV mortgages is higher than the default rate for either
79% or 81% LTV mortgages. As discussed above, this pattern would be expected if 80% mortgages
























30are frequently accompanied by second-lien mortgages, but 70% and 81% mortgages are not. Away
from 80%, however, we have more conﬁdence that the leverage implied by the ﬁrst lien on the
property is an accurate measure of total leverage.
Figure 11 displays the cumulative default frequencies plotted against the time since origination
for loans in our data set. Mindful of the potential problems interpreting the default behavior
for 80% LTV loans, we deﬁned a low LTV mortgage to be one where :65 < LTV < :75, and a
corresponding high LTV mortgage by :85 < LTV < :95. The high-LTV mortgages default at about
twice the rate of low-LTV mortgages. Note that even though the relative rates of default between
high and low LTV mortgages are about the same for FRMs and ARMs, the level of the default rate
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So far all these results, following the theoretical model, ignore borrowers’ risk factors. In the
31discussion above we noted that, in reality, borrowers are often unable to repay mortgages at their
economic values when these have dropped. Thus, default frequencies would be expected to depend
on borrowers’ risk variables as well as LTV and house prices. This dependence is seen in the
data. The two right-most panels of Figure 11 show the diﬀerential performance of high FICO score
mortgages compared to low FICO score mortgages. FICO score is negatively correlated with LTV
in our data. However, holding LTV constant, we still see that low FICO score borrowers default
much more than high FICO score borrowers. For FRMs with :85 < LTV < :95, the default rate
40 months after origination was about 5% for borrowers with FICO scores below 700, as compared
to 2% for borrowers with FICO scores above 700. For ARMs, the corresponding default rates were
20% and 8% for high and low FICO score borrowers, respectively.
We can also see the clear eﬀects of diﬀerential house price appreciation on the cumulative
default rates. For all classes of mortgages—ﬁxed and adjustable—and for all ranges of LTV, the
2002 vintages performed much better than the 2006 vintages (Figure 12). Of course, virtually all
mortgage borrowers in the 2006 vintage experienced house price depreciation over the following
three years. Even so, it is remarkable to see the disastrous performance of the high LTV ARMs
in the 2006 vintage (in Figure 12, note the diﬀerence between the vertical scale in the lower right
panel and the others). Within 24 months, nearly half of this vintage was in default.
In summary, the data provide clear evidence that LTV is a risk factor: for both FRMs and
ARMs, high LTV loans have signiﬁcantly higher default rates than low LTV loans. This is true
both unconditionally and conditional on risk factors.
3.3 LTV and Mortgage Pricing
In the theoretical model it was assumed that equilibrium mortgage pricing takes account of default
risk. Because initial LTV governs default risk, the model predicts that mortgage spreads (equal to
the diﬀerence between the coupon rate on mortgages less the risk-free return) depend positively
on initial LTV (because the optimal default point is higher for high-LTV mortgages, implying that
default is more probable with them).
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33or more we used the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed mortgage rate and the average 10-year constant
maturity Treasury yield in the 30 days leading up to the date the mortgage was originated. For
ARMs we used the so-called “margin rate”, which is the diﬀerence between the mortgage rate and
the benchmark rate to which the ARM is tied. To estimate the spread-LTV relationship, we assume
that the spread on mortgage i with LTV j in market k can be modeled as,
sijk = ak + dj + Xi: (3.1)
Here, ak is a market-speciﬁc intercept meant to capture possible variation in expectations for
future house price behavior and volatility across geographic areas. A local market is deﬁned as a
metropolitan statistical area (MSA). All mortgages on properties not located in an MSA are coded
as “rural.” To capture the relationship between spread and LTV as ﬂexibly as possible, we partition
the space of LTV ratios into 5 percentage point intervals (or buckets). The term dj is speciﬁc to
all loans with j% < LTV  j + 5% for j ranging from 45% to 95%. That is, the 45%-50% bucket
is the lowest LTV bucket and 95%-100% is the highest bucket. The speciﬁcation above also allows
us to include a vector of risk factors, Xi. These factors control for sources of risk that were not
considered in the theory, but are likely to be priced by lenders and to be correlated with LTV.
To this end, we included credit score, the log of loan amount, and indicators for whether the loan
is a subprime loan, exceeds the conforming loan limit (i.e, is a jumbo loan), is securitized in a
nonagency securitization, has fully documented income, and whether or not it has a prepayment
penalty. When considering ARMs, we also included dummy variables for whether the mortgage
is interest-only, for whether it is an option ARM, and for the benchmark index that the ARM
rate is based on.12 In all of the results to be presented, we dropped mortgages that had mortgage
insurance.
In our estimation of eq. (3.1), we appended a random disturbance to account for unobserved
factors and estimated the model by OLS. We also entered year dummies to capture the behavior
of systematic economic factors over time. The main objects of interest are the estimates of the
dj terms. These terms are literally the coeﬃcients on a set dummy variables for the LTV buckets
12In our data, the vast majority of the ARMs are indexed to either the 1-year T-bill or 6-month LIBOR.
34where the lowest LTV bucket— 45-50%—is the omitted category. Thus, the coeﬃcient estimate
on a particular LTV bucket—say 85-90% LTV—is the estimate of the excess spread paid to raise
the LTV from the 45-50% range to 85-90%, controlling for the market in which the property is
located. Figure 13 shows estimated mortgage spreads against LTV for FRMs and ARMs, separately
estimated. The solid line shows coeﬃcients of the LTV dummies without correction for risk factors
other than LTV, while the dashed line allows for the risk factors.
For FRMs the inclusion of the risk factors has virtually no eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of the LTV
dummies: with or without the risk factors, high LTV mortgages are characterized by spreads that
are about 40 basis points higher than for low LTV mortgages. Thus in the data the premium on
high-LTV FRM loans does not depend on whether or not one corrects for risk factors. This striking
result is contrary to our prior expectation, which was that the spread-LTV locus would be ﬂatter
when risk controls were included than when they were not. Of course, the risk factors considered
here do have an eﬀect on loan pricing: for example, low credit score borrowers tend to have higher
mortgage rates than high credit score borrowers, all else held equal. Our ﬁnding is that the risk
factors do not interact with LTV.
Turning to ARMs, without correcting for risk factors the estimated diﬀerence between spreads
on high vs low LTV ARMs is much greater, at about 150 basis points, than that on FRMs. Including
the risk factors reduces the diﬀerential yield spread to 90 basis points. Thus, whether or not one
controls for risk factors, high LTV borrowers with ARMs were perceived by lenders to be much
riskier than low LTV borrowers with ARMs. In the previous section we saw that these beliefs were
justiﬁed in view of the fact that default rates have been much higher for high LTV ARMs than for
low LTV ARMs.13
We also see that the eﬀect of LTV on yield spreads is much greater when the risk factors are
13The relationship between spreads and LTV for ARMs is not monotonic. In the ﬁgure, the reversal where spreads
actually decline as LTV increases comes at 85% LTV. This appears to be due to a type of market segmentation that
is prominent for ARMs, yet much less visible in the FRM data. For ARMs, both the mortgage rate and the credit
score change discontinuously around 85% LTV, with the credit score rising sharply and the rate falling . The fall
in the mortgage rate is so abrupt, however, that it is diﬃcult to capture it in the regression framework used here.
Admittedly, our sample of ﬁrst lien ARMs with no mortgage insurance is relatively thin at the highest LTV levels.
However, we favor the interpretation that the real-world loan pricing function is suﬃciently complex at high levels
of LTV, with interactions between LTV and other borrower risk factors becoming increasingly important. What
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36excluded than when they are included. Given the correlation between LTV and risk factors, this is
the expected outcome. We have no explanation for why the same result does not obtain for FRMs.
4 Calibrating the Model
The ﬁnal exercise is to attempt a calibration of the model. As in the numerical example discussed
above, we set the housing service ﬂow drift at =3% and the rate of time preference equal to =7%;
these values produce empirically realistic values for the real return on housing and mortgages, and
a realistic value for the price-rent ratio, as discussed above. With these maintained speciﬁcations
in place, the key determinants of mortgage rates and expected default behavior in the model will
be the volatility of changes in housing services () and the assumptions on borrower and lender
default costs (kb and kl).
We will focus on mortgages with LTV around 95%. Excluding mortgages with LTV equal
to 80% is appropriate because, as discussed above, many of these mortgages are associated with
second-lien loans. This diﬃculty probably does not occur in mortgages with LTV less than 80%, but
another problem arises. Mortgages with LTV below 80% were likely to be eligible for guarantee by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Consequently, whether or not such mortgages were actually sold to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac upon origination, mortgage lenders have no incentive to incorporate
default costs in pricing except insofar as these costs are implicitly reﬂected in the prices at which
the mortgages can be sold. Whether or not this is the case is far from clear. Also, default risk is a
minor factor in the pricing of low-LTV mortgages, so in any case such mortgages are of secondary
interest given our focus on default and its consequences for mortgage pricing. We are left with
mortgages with LTV over 80%; for concreteness, we focus on mortgages with LTV around 95%.
In view of the fact that we do not have a theoretical model for ARMs, our attention in this
section is restricted to FRMs.
We assumed that mortgages are not prepayable (kp = 1). Relaxing this assumption and
incorporating a prepayment penalty of kp has the same qualitative eﬀect on the spread-LTV plot
as imposing strictly positive lender’s costs (doing either makes the spread-LTV plot more convex;
37compare Figures 5 and 6). Thus, we proceed under the assumption of costly default and no
possibility for prepayment.
Calibrating the model will consist of specifying parameters that generate empirically accurate
values of the spread on mortgages with LTV around 95%, and that generate default behavior that
appears to be reasonable. We showed above that empirically the spread for 95% mortgages is
around 30-40 basis points, so we prefer parameter values that generate approximately that value.
Reproducing default behavior is more diﬃcult. Ideally, we would back out the default point from
the recovery rate and the other parameter values. Our data set contains the recovery rate as a
variable, but it is extremely sparsely populated, so this estimator is not open to us. Using actual
default rates will not allow a precise calibration because default rates are extremely variable, even
among mortgages issued at the same time with equal LTVs. We are reduced to imposing on the
data an arbitrary prior speciﬁcation of default points and recovery rates. We assumed that the
recovery rate on a 95% mortgage is around 60-70%, and calibrate to this value.14
We begin by considering the speciﬁcation of : In the empirical housing literature estimated
price volatility is around 15%. For example, using data from the PSID, Flavin and Yamashita
(2002) estimated the standard deviation of the real return on housing to be about 14%. Case
and Shiller (1989) report similar estimates for the return on individual houses (14-15%).15 After
aggregating individual units to the city or the national level, most house price indices display much
less volatility. The annual price change in the Case-Shiller Composite 10 City index has a standard
deviation of about 9% between 1987 and 2008. The annual price change in the FHFA house price
index is a little over 3% over the same time period. Since the loan pricing that we are studying
corresponds to rates on individual mortgages, we take the higher estimates of  to be more realistic.
We will start by specifying  = 15%, but we will also consider  = 10%:
Table 3 reports computations from the theoretical pricing model that are useful in the calibration
14If kl = 0, calibrating from the recovery rate is equivalent to calibrating from the default point (see footnote 4).
If kl > 0; for given default point the recovery rate relevant for the lender will be lower than that resulting from this
calculation.
It is worth noting from this that if one had separate priors about the default point and the recovery rate, one could
in principle directly calibrate kl:
15The Flavin and Yamashita and the Case and Shiller estimates of the standard deviation of housing returns are
based on data sampled from across the United States. Our sample is drawn solely from California, arguably implying
higher values for the volatility parameter.
38exercise. Each panel displays the solutions for parameters of interest under a particular speciﬁcation
of , kb and kl. The rows of the table show the values of LTV, the yield, the recovery rate and the
default point under various speciﬁcations of ; kb and kl: The columns are associated with values
of c (not shown) that increase moving toward the right; as noted, in each panel we will focus on
the value of c that produces the LTV closest to 95% (indicated in boldface).
The ﬁrst project is to determine whether one can produce an empirically accurate model under
kb = kl = 0: Panel 1 shows that the spread on a 97% mortgage is 121 basis points, the recovery
rate is 91% and the default point is 89%. These values are all much higher than we see in the data,
so this speciﬁcation must be rejected.
A lower value of  would be expected to render default less probable (at least under the as-
sumption that the eﬀect of reducing  on the default point is minor). Panel 2 shows that the eﬀect
of reducing volatility to  = 10% is to produce a spread of 36 basis points on a 95% mortgage,
approximately equaling that seen in the data. However, the eﬀects of specifying the lower value
of  on the default point and the recovery rate are minor, implying that the predicted values for
these variables remain much higher than the values we are looking for. We conclude that, despite
the simpliﬁcation that would result from excluding default costs, doing so does not produce a
satisfactory calibration.
We have seen that when borrowers incur costs upon default, the spread-LTV relation becomes
ﬂatter; for given LTV, default costs decrease the default point and decrease the eﬀects of the
default option on the spread. Such a change would be expected to move the model predictions in
the direction of the data. Panel 3 shows  = 15%; kb = 4; kl = 0: Making this change reduces the
spread on a 92% mortgage to 60 basis points, only slightly higher than what we see in the data.
The recovery rate and default point are 71% and 65%, which are also close to the values we seek.
One could make a case for an even higher value for kb; if kb = 8; so that default costs equal
32% of the purchase price of a house, then the yield spread on a 94% loan is 38 basis points, the
recovery rate is 56% and the default point is 53%.16
On prior grounds it is unclear whether borrowers’ default costs are positive or negative. How-
16In Panel 4, under the assumed parameter values borrowers never default when c = :5.
39Table 3: Model-calibrated yields and LTV
(1)  = 15%, kb = kl = 0
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) 28.54 42.65 56.38 69.36 81.04 90.69 97.40
Yield(%) 7.01 7.04 7.10 7.21 7.40 7.72 8.21
Recovery(%) 77.69 77.98 78.65 79.91 82.07 85.56 91.05
Default point 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.55 0.67 0.78 0.89
(2)  = 10%, kb = kl = 0
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) 28.57 42.85 57.09 71.10 84.28 95.09 100.00
Yield(%) 7.00 7.00 7.01 7.03 7.12 7.36 8.00
Recovery(%) 87.50 87.51 87.59 87.91 88.99 92.02 100.00
Default point 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.88 1.00
(3)  = 15%, kb = 4;kl = 0
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) 28.57 42.76 56.66 69.90 81.95 92.09 99.41
Yield(%) 7.00 7.02 7.06 7.15 7.32 7.60 8.05
Recovery(%) 34.15 48.74 56.35 61.53 66.01 70.78 76.72
Default point 0.10 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.54 0.65 0.76
(4)  = 15%, kb = 8;kl = 0
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) . 42.85 57.01 70.75 83.59 94.84 103.62
Yield(%) . 7.00 7.02 7.07 7.18 7.38 7.72
Recovery(%) . 19.66 34.22 43.24 49.86 55.64 61.62
Default point . 0.08 0.20 0.31 0.42 0.53 0.64
(5)  = 15%, kb = 0;kl = 4
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) 28.45 42.29 55.42 67.28 77.14 84.05 86.84
Yield(%) 7.03 7.09 7.22 7.43 7.78 8.33 9.21
Recovery(%) 21.69 40.80 51.14 58.60 65.48 73.29 83.69
Default point 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.55 0.67 0.78 0.89
(6)  = 15%, kb = 4;kl = 4
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) 28.56 42.69 56.35 69.04 80.04 88.46 93.15
Yield(%) 7.00 7.03 7.10 7.24 7.50 7.91 8.59
Recovery(%) -21.87 11.34 28.26 39.12 47.59 55.60 64.70
Default point 0.10 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.54 0.65 0.76
(7)  = 10%, kb = 4;kl = 4
c 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
LTV(%) 28.57 42.86 57.11 71.18 84.44 95.08 98.88
Yield(%) 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.02 7.12 7.36 8.10
Recovery(%) -17.50 17.50 35.02 45.66 53.30 60.48 70.80
Default point 0.11 0.24 0.36 0.49 0.61 0.74 0.86
40ever, there is not much doubt that lenders’ default costs are positive and high. Therefore we might
want to impose kl > 0 on any candidate set of parameter values. However, we have already seen
that introducing lenders’ costs increases the curvature of the spread-LTV curve, so setting kl > 0
together with kb = 0 is not likely to produce an accurate calibration. Indeed, as Panel 5 shows,
under these parameter values the model cannot produce LTV anywhere near 95% for any value of
c. For LTV=87% default occurs at an unrealistically high value of x (x = :89); and lenders would
require a spread of 221 basis points to compensate them for expected default costs. These values
are a long way from those seen in the data.
It follows from this that kl > 0 cannot produce an accurate calibration in conjunction with
kb = 0; but this is not necessarily the case if kb is also strictly positive. Borrowers’ default costs
decrease the default point, therefore attenuating the eﬀect of default on LTV (for given c) and the
spread. In Panel 6 we show  = 15%; kb = kl = 4: Under these values the lender is willing to fund
a 93% loan, but only under a spread of 159 basis points, which again is much higher than in the
data. The recovery rate is 65% and the default point is 76%, which are also probably too high.
In Panel 7 we continue to assume kb = kl = 4; but set  equal to 10%. On a 95% loan this
speciﬁcation produces a spread of 36 basis points, a recovery rate of 60% and a default point of 74%.
All of these values are plausible, although as noted the speciﬁcation  = 10% is itself probably too
low.
In sum, we conclude that Panels 3 ( = 15%; kb = 4; kl = 0) and 7 ( = :1; kb = 4; kl = 4)
produce the best results. The speciﬁcation of Panel 3 has the drawback that it unrealistically sets
lender costs at zero, while the Panel 7 run speciﬁes a value of  that is probably unrealistically low.
5 Conclusions
In the introduction we observed that the high mortgage default rates of the past several years,
together with the resulting huge losses to holders of mortgages, could reﬂect either drastic mispricing
of mortgages or extreme realizations of shocks. We assumed initially that it would not be diﬃcult to
ﬁnd evidence that mispricing is the major culprit. However, that has not been the case: we are able
to calibrate a model of optimal mortgage default and mortgage pricing that has reasonable success
41in reproducing the patterns in the data. Assuming Wall Street ﬁrms were using models similar
to that presented here (granted, it is not clear that this was the case), it follows that mispricing
is of secondary importance relative to extreme realizations of house price shocks. Of course, with
hindsight it is easy to criticize lenders and borrowers for not predicting that the housing price
bubble would eventually be reversed, and acting accordingly. Our point is only that models that
rule out foresight of house price changes—a realistic speciﬁcation, in our opinion—can be calibrated
to the data with fair success.
Let us be a bit more speciﬁc about the successes and failures of our modeling exercise. Most
obviously, the model here does not predict the event of default with anything like complete accuracy.
As noted, the model predicts that all the mortgages with a given LTV initiated at a given date will
all default at the same time if any of them defaults. In fact there is wide variation in the default
points. This variation reﬂects the importance of life events in motivating default. The assumption
here that borrowers can always buy back their mortgages at prices equal to economic values had
the eﬀect of shutting down his line of causation. It should not be surprising that considerable loss
of explanatory power results.
The qualitative predictions of the model for default and pricing turn out to be largely substan-
tiated in the data. High-LTV mortgages are more prone to default than low-LTV mortgages, as the
model (or common sense) predicts. Further, the dependence of mortgage pricing on LTV conforms
to the prediction of the model (more precisely, we can ﬁnd parameter values for which this is the
case).
One striking ﬁnding is that for FRMs the eﬀect of LTV on yield spreads appears to be separable
from the other risk factors; speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence between the yields on two otherwise identical
mortgages with diﬀerent LTV is the same whether or not one corrects for risk factors other than
LTV. The interpretation is that the eﬀect of LTV on expected default does not interact to a major
extent with other risk factors. Having this result greatly simpliﬁes the analysis of the eﬀect of LTV
on default and mortgage pricing.
Two other caveats made in the text above bear repeating here. First, the equilibrium depends
on parameters like default costs that are extremely diﬃcult to measure directly. As a result of our
42inability to calibrate these parameters credibly, we take the view that model is not readily testable.
Second, we noted that our data set does not allow us to link ﬁrst- and second-lien mortgages,
making it diﬃcult to measure LTVs on 80% mortgages. We proceeded despite this problem, but
there is no denying its importance.
One of the most important empirical conclusions stated above is that FRMs and ARMs display
very diﬀerent behavior: high-LTV ARMs are much more prone to default than FRMs with the
same LTV. Further, this dramatic diﬀerence in default behavior is reﬂected in pricing in exactly
the way the model predicts: the yield premium on high-LTV ARMs appears to be much larger
than the yield premium for otherwise similar FRMs. This diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that ARMs
are easier to qualify for than FRMs, implying that highly qualiﬁed borrowers make greater use of
FRMs and less-qualiﬁed borrowers specialize in ARMs. This observation, while correct, leaves open
the question why lenders set the standards for qualiﬁcation so diﬀerently in the two cases.
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